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I. INTRODUCTION: A PRETEXT . . . FOR WHAT? 
In March 2018, Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross announced that the 
Trump Administration would add a question to the 2020 census asking the 
citizenship status of all persons in the United States. The question, Secretary 
Ross asserted, would generate “complete and accurate [citizenship] data”2 
that the Department of Justice (DOJ) could use to better enforce Section 2 of 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA)3—a law that sometimes requires states 
and localities to draw districts in which voters of color make up a majority 
of the voting age population (so-called “majority-minority” districts).4 
From the start, there were reasons to be skeptical that VRA enforcement 
motivated the Secretary’s decision. For one, a question asking the 
citizenship status of all persons in the United States had not appeared on 
the decennial census form provided to every household in the fifty-five 
years since the VRA was signed into law. In turn, DOJ has never used or 
claimed to need the kind of individual-level citizenship data Secretary Ross 
now claimed would be key to its enforcement duties. Secretary Ross also 
ignored Census Bureau career staff’s insistence that already available 
citizenship data (like Social Security records) could better serve the DOJ in 
its VRA enforcement duties. And it was frankly difficult to believe that the 
Trump Administration—which, at the time, had yet to file a single case 
under Section 2 of the VRA—suddenly viewed minority voting rights as a 
priority. 
In June 2018, the ACLU sued the Commerce Department in New York 
federal court on behalf of various immigrant rights’ groups to enjoin 
Secretary Ross’s decision. The case was consolidated with a related suit 
brought by various states and municipalities,5 proceeded to trial, and 
 
2. Memorandum from Sec’y of Commerce Wilbur Ross to Under Sec’y for Econ. 
Affairs Karen Dunn Kelley, Reinstatement of a Citizenship Question on the 2020 
Decennial Census Questionnaire 8 (Mar. 26, 2018), 
https://www.commerce.gov/sites/default/files/2018-03-26_2.pdf. 
3. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 et seq. 
4. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986). 
5. Specifically, the case was consolidated with a related suit brought by 18 states, 
the District of Columbia, several major U.S. cities, and the U.S. Conference of 
Mayors. Two similar suits were filed later in federal courts in Maryland and 
California. 
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ultimately brought to the Supreme Court. In a ruling issued on the last day 
of its term, in June 2019, the Supreme Court concluded that Secretary Ross 
reached his decision to add a citizenship question unlawfully.6 Writing for 
the Court, Chief Justice John Roberts held that “the VRA enforcement 
rationale—the sole stated reason [for the decision to add a citizenship 
question]—seem[ed] to have been contrived.”7 
These were strong words from the Court: a clear acknowledgment that 
the Administration lied, and for that reason, did not meet the relatively low 
bar that demands all agency action be justified by reasoned decision-
making.8 Further, the Court confirmed the findings of the three federal 
district judges who reviewed the Secretary’s decision, including the judge 
overseeing the ACLU suit, who concluded that the VRA was “a post hoc 
rationale for a decision that [the] Secretary had already made for other 
reasons.”9 Chief Justice Roberts agreed that the VRA rationale was false, a 
mask for the real reasons why Secretary Ross sought to add a citizenship 
question to the  decennial census. But strikingly, neither the Chief Justice 
nor the three federal district courts that enjoined Secretary Ross’s decision 
identified those reasons.10 
The courts’ silence begs an obvious question—even if the citizenship 
question does not appear on the 2020 census questionnaire. What was the 
Trump Administration’s real motivation to add it in the first place? And once 
it sought to add the question, why did it hide behind a “contrived” 
justification? 
The true motivation for the citizenship question is now obvious: the 
Trump Administration sought to bolster white political power at the 
expense of communities of color. It did so in two separate ways. First, 
adding a citizenship question to the 2020 census would dramatically reduce 
 
6. Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551 (2019). 
7. Id. at 2575 (emphasis added). 
8. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). 
9. New York v. Dep’t of Commerce, 351 F. Supp. 3d 502, 570 (S.D.N.Y. 2019). A 
district court in California later concluded that Secretary Ross’s rationale “was 
a mere pretext . . . [that] did not supply the true basis of [his] decision.” 
California v. Ross, 358 F. Supp. 3d 965, 1040 (N.D. Cal. 2019). A third judge in 
the District of Maryland reached the same conclusion. See Kravitz v. Dep’t of 
Commerce, No. 18-cv-1041, 2019 WL 1510449, at *52 (D. Md. 2019). 
10. See, e.g., New York, 351 F. Supp. 3d at 569 (stating that while “promoting 
enforcement of the VRA was not [Secretary Ross’s] real reason for the 
decision,” the court was “unable to determine—based on the existing record, 
at least—what [his] real reasons for adding the citizenship question were”). 
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response rates in noncitizen households, exacerbating the “differential 
undercount”—”the gap between the overcount of whites and the 
undercount of communities of color”11—with dramatic consequences for 
immigrant communities with respect to apportionment, redistricting, and 
allocation of federal resources. The trial records across three separate 
cases, the agency’s administrative record, and stunningly candid documents 
from subsequent litigation revealed by happenstance and congressional 
testimony leave no doubt on the point.12 And while successful challenges to 
the policy kept the citizenship question off the 2020 census, some damage 
may already be done, as many people in targeted communities likely (and 
understandably) feel confusion and residual fear over its saga.13 
Still, a second central, but perhaps less-understood, reason also played 
a role: the Trump Administration almost certainly sought data needed for 
willing states and localities to redraw districts based on citizen voting-age 
population (CVAP), rather than total population. True to the Fourteenth 
Amendment, states presently draw legislative lines based on the “whole 
number of persons” within their borders.14 This means that people such as 
noncitizens, children, and incarcerated persons both count and have their 
interests represented by legislators “whether or not they qualify as voters.”15 
The rule ensures that “voters in each district have the power to elect a 
 
11. Janai Nelson, Counting Change: Ensuring An Inclusive Census for Communities 
of Color, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 1399, 1427 (2019). 
12. See, e.g., Michael Wines, A Census Whodunit: Why Was the Citizenship Question 
Added?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/30/us/census-citizenship-question-
hofeller.html. 
13. See, e.g., Pew Research Center, Most Adults Aware of 2020 Census and Ready to 
Respond, but Don’t Know Key Details 5 (Feb. 20, 2020) (noting 56% of U.S. 
adults “incorrectly believes a citizenship question is on the questionnaire,” 
while 25% are “not sure”), 
https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2020/02/20/the-u-s-census-and-
privacy-concerns/; Edith Honan, Citizenship question dropped from census, but 
advocates fear ‘damage has been done’, ABC NEWS (July 12, 2019) (“[L]awyers 
and immigration rights advocates who opposed adding the question [said] 
that, like a bell that can’t be unrung, the mere discussion of it, coupled with 
the president’s Muslim ban and policies on immigrants at the southern 
border, has left people on edge.”), 
https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/citizenship-question-dropped-census-
advocates-fear-damage/story?id=64225417. 
14. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (emphasis added). 
15. Evenwel v. Abbott, 136. S. Ct. 1120, 1129 (2016) (emphasis added).. 
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representative who represents the same number of constituents as all other 
representatives.”16 
This representational equality principle is under relentless attack, not 
only from conservative activists but from the current Administration, who 
would like to see the number of possible voters used as the relevant 
redistricting metric. Their calculus is political: by erasing millions of 
residents from the count used to draw legislative maps, they hope to shift 
political power away from the racially diverse areas where many nonvoting 
immigrants live to more sparsely populated, rural, and homogeneously 
white places with a greater proportion of eligible voters. Almost four years 
on, it is exceedingly clear that the Trump Administration tried to facilitate 
this exclusionary practice by including a citizenship question on the census 
to obtain certain data that it believed was needed for CVAP-based 
apportionment. 
It is therefore crucial both to name and to understand the Trump 
Administration’s CVAP-related purpose because, as recent events continue 
to show, the battle over who we count as part of our democracy is far from 
over. Since its loss at the Supreme Court, the Administration has sought to 
achieve the same objectives by other means. In July 2019, shortly after the 
Supreme Court’s citizenship question decision, President Trump ordered 
executive agencies to provide the Census Bureau available citizenship data 
in a transparent attempt to supply willing states with CVAP data to use in 
apportionment. This CVAP-based approach would literally leave millions 
uncounted and without representation in American democracy, 
dramatically diluting the political power of immigrant communities and 
communities of color. And it would do so purposefully.  
   
Despite its decisive losses in federal courts, the Trump Administration 
is persisting in its efforts to disempower communities it sees as politically 
unfavorable. In July 2020, as this article went to print, the Administration 
went even further, announcing a policy to exclude undocumented 
immigrants from the population figures used to apportion seats among 
states in the House of Representatives.17 This approach would be a radical 
departure from the way apportionment has been conducted throughout 
 
16. Id. at 1126 (quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Appellees at 5, Evenwel, 136 S. Ct. 1120 (No. 14-940)). 
17  See Memorandum on Excluding Illegal Aliens from the Apportionment Base, 
85 Fed. Reg. 44,679 (July 21, 2020). 
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American history and contradicts the plain text of the Constitution.18 It has 
unsurprisingly been the subject of immediate litigation, in which the 
authors again act as counsel.19  
This new policy makes the actual motivation for the failed citizenship 
question effort even clearer. As the citizenship question would have, 
excluding undocumented immigrants from the apportionment count will 
reduce response rates and exacerbate the differential undercount of 
communities of color.20 Deleting millions of noncitizens from the 
apportionment count is a straightforward attempt, lacking even the pretext 
of the citizenship question, to reduce the political power of more racially 
diverse states.21 If the Trump Administration wanted to show the 
citizenship question’s true goal, it could not have done so more effectively 
than it has by openly moving to excise undocumented noncitizens from the 
apportionment count. 
   The fight over the citizenship question also shows that the broader civil 
rights community—and litigators in particular—must play a critical role 
both in calling out this threat and preventing it from coming to pass. When 
 
18  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (“Representatives . . . shall be apportioned among 
the several States . . . according to their respective Numbers . . . .”); U.S. CONST. 
amend. XIV, § 2 (“Representatives shall be apportioned among the several 
States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of 
persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed.”). 
19  The authors are presently counsel, with others, in New York Immigration 
Coalition v. Trump, No. 1:20-cv-05871-JMF (S.D.N.Y.). Other suits have been 
filed in California, the District of Columbia, Maryland, and Massachusetts. 
20  While the Memorandum still envisions that the Census will enumerate all 
persons regardless of legal status, it is inevitable that responses will suffer 
particularly among undocumented persons as a result of the Memorandum, 
especially when combined with the Census Bureau’s last-minute decision to 
cease data collection and non-response follow-ups one month early. See U.S. 
Census Bureau, Statement from U.S. Census Bureau Director Steven Dillingham: 
Delivering a Complete and Accurate 2020 Census Count (Aug. 3, 2020), 
https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2020/delivering-
complete-accurate-count.html.  
21  See, e.g., Jeffrey S. Passel & D’Vera Cohn, How removing unauthorized 
immigrants from census statistics could affect House reapportionment, Pew 
Research Ctr. (July 24, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2020/07/24/how-removing-unauthorized-immigrants-from-census-
statistics-could-affect-house-reapportionment/ (predicting a loss of House 
seats for California, Florida, and Texas). Indeed, the Memorandum explicitly 
anticipates a loss of seats for at least one state. See Memorandum, 84 Fed. Reg. 
at 44,680. 
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Secretary Ross announced his decision in March 2018, much of the 
“smoking gun” evidence of a “contrived” rationale was unknown to few 
outside the soon-to-be defendants’ inner circle. The full scope of the 
Administration’s efforts to force a citizenship question onto the census at 
the expense of the count’s accuracy only became clear in the course of 
protracted, often contentious discovery. And even then, some of the most 
damning evidence for the policy’s true purpose was revealed by chance in 
an unrelated case, when lawyers who worked on both matters obtained 
documents showing that the late Dr. Thomas Hofeller, a prominent 
Republican redistricting “expert,”22 originated the VRA rationale that 
Secretary Ross ultimately adopted for the specific purpose of favoring 
“Republicans and Non-Hispanic Whites” in redistricting.23 
Written by advocates who successfully challenged the citizenship 
question, this article details the two most obvious rationales for the Trump 
Administration’s “contrived” attempt to change the 2020 census 
questionnaire. First, it surveys the course of litigation against the 
citizenship question—as well as some of the crucial evidence gleaned along 
the way—to explain that, at a minimum, the Administration sought to 
exacerbate an undercount among immigrant communities and 
communities of color. This undercount would have redounded to those 
communities’ detriment by diminishing their democratic representation 
and political clout. Second, the article explains how the citizenship question 
also likely formed part of a long-term project to fundamentally change the 
rules of American democracy by letting states count only voters for 
redistricting purposes, not all persons, at the expense of urban areas with 
large noncitizen communities. Finally, the article looks forward at a time of 
renewed and persistent efforts to restrict noncitizen participation in the 
census. With the benefit of hindsight, litigation over the citizenship question 
offers a case study in the capacity of impact litigation to promote both 
transparency and public education against harmful policies based on false 
or manufactured rationales. The article closes by briefly highlighting some 
lessons that can be taken from this litigation and offers a few thoughts on 
where activists and litigators can proceed. 
 
22. Michael Wines, Deceased G.O.P. Strategist’s Hard Drives Reveal New Details on 
the Census Citizenship Question, N.Y. TIMES (May 30, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/30/us/census-citizenship-question-
hofeller.html. 
23. See Letter Motion to Show Cause at 55-63, State of New York v. Dep’t of 





II. SECRETARY ROSS’S REAL RATIONALE—TARGETING COMMUNITIES OF COLOR 
On December 12, 2017, General Counsel of the DOJ’s Justice 
Management Division Arthur Gary wrote the Commerce Department to 
“formally request” that the Census Bureau put “a question regarding 
citizenship” on the 2020 census form.24 The letter claimed that the 
citizenship data DOJ had long used in discharging its VRA enforcement 
duties, which presently comes from the American Community Survey (ACS) 
annually sent to 3.5 million U.S. households, was not “ideal” for that 
purpose.25 Three months later, Secretary Ross published a decisional memo 
announcing that the 2020 census form would include a citizenship question 
and claiming that the decision was made as a result of a process that was 
initiated “[f]ollowing the receipt of the [December] DOJ request.”26 He also 
testified to Congress that Commerce’s decision “respond[ed] solely to 
Department of Justice’s request.”27 
Secretary Ross’s decision was momentous; there had not been a 
question on citizenship on the census questionnaire sent to all American 
households in seventy years.28 Since 1950, when a citizenship-related 
question has been asked at all—either in the census “long form” 
questionnaire from 1970-2000 or the current annual American Community 
Survey (“ACS”)—it has only been sent to a fraction of the population.29 Even 
 
24. Letter from Arthur Gary, Gen. Counsel, DOJ, to Ron Jarmin, Dep’t of Commerce 
re: Request to Reinstate Citizenship Question on 2020 Census Questionnaire 




26. Memo, supra note 2 at 323. 
27. New York, 351 F. Supp. 3d at 546. 
28. See Susan McFarland, For the First Time in 70 Years, 2020 Census to Ask About 
Citizenship, UPI (Mar. 27, 2018), 
https://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2018/03/27/For-first-time-in-70-
years-2020-Census-to-ask-about-citizenship/7821522148442/. 
29. From 1970 to 2000, about one-sixth of all American households received the 
long form questionnaire, which at that time asked a question about citizenship 
or birthplace to those households. See Justin Levitt, Citizenship and the Census, 
119 COLUM. L. REV. 1355, 1360 n.23 (2019). In 2000, the Census Bureau began 
phasing out the long form survey and instated the ACS, an annual survey sent 
to just two percent of American households. The ACS, which is not used for 
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before 1950, the Census Bureau inquired only about the naturalization 
status of foreign-born persons; “[i]ndeed, the census ha[d] never [directly] 
asked for the citizenship status of everyone in the country” before Secretary 
Ross proposed doing so in March 2018.30 
This was well-reasoned policy. For decades, Census Bureau experts 
warned that adding a question on the citizenship status of all persons would 
dramatically undermine the accuracy of the population count by driving 
down response rates of noncitizens, their families, and others who live in 
their communities.31 In the lead-up to the 1980 census, for example, Bureau 
Director Vincent Barabba pragmatically explained that it would be 
“unrealistic to expect unlawful residents to cooperate fully in an interview 
dealing with their legal status,”32 and added that he expected that a 
citizenship question would also “make it more difficult . . . to get the 
cooperation [of] minority groups who are legal citizens or legally resident 
aliens.”33 And as recently as 2016, former Bureau Directors appointed by 
presidents of both political parties explained to the Supreme Court that a 
citizenship question would “lower response to the census in general” and 
“seriously frustrate the [Bureau’s] ability to conduct the only count the 
Constitution expressly requires: determining the whole number of persons 
in each state in order to apportion House seats among the states.”34 
 
enumeration or apportionment purposes, has included a citizenship question 
since its inception. See New York, 351 F. Supp. 3d at 520. 
30. Thomas P. Wolf & Brianna Cea, A Critical History of the United States Census 
and Citizenship Questions, 108 GEO. L. J. ONLINE 1, 5 (2019). 
31. See, e.g., Fed’n for Am. Immigration Reform v. Klutznick, 486 F. Supp. 564, 568 
(D.D.C. 1980) (“[A]ccording to the Bureau; any effort to ascertain citizenship 
will inevitably jeopardize the overall accuracy of the population count.”); see 
also Census Equity Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Census & 
Population of the H. Comm. On Post Office & Civ. Serv., 101st Cong. 43-45, 59 
(1989) (noting asking about citizenship could result in the Census Bureau 
being “perceived as an enforcement agency” and would have “a major effect 
on census coverage”). 
32. 1980 Census: Counting Illegal Aliens: Hearing on S.2366 before the Subcomm. 
On Energy, Nuclear Proliferation, and Fed. Services of the S. Comm. on 
Governmental Affairs, 96 Cong. 67-68 (1980) (statement of Vincent Barabba, 
Director, Census Bureau). 
33. Id. at 68-69. 
34. Brief of Former Directors of the U.S. Census Bureau as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Appellees at 25, Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120 (2016). 
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Abandoning this well-reasoned policy to add a citizenship question to 
the census would gravely harm our democracy and millions of people who 
primarily reside in already-vulnerable communities—for two reasons. 
First, by the government’s own admission at the time, the question would 
cause 6.5 million fewer people to respond to the census,35 a figure that the 
Bureau later revised upwards to almost nine million.36 And because census 
data is used to apportion representation in Congress and draw legislative 
districts, the resulting undercount would dramatically reduce the 
representation and curb the political influence of communities with large 
noncitizen populations and states in which many noncitizens live. For 
context, a drop in responses of nine million would be the same as if the 
census skipped New Jersey—a state with twelve seats in Congress and 
fourteen Electoral College votes.37 New York, California, Illinois, Florida, 
Arizona, and Texas were all primed to lose at least a seat in Congress,38 
while immigrant communities would drastically “lose political power” in 
“intrastate redistricting.”39 
Second, the census population count determines the allotment of 
hundreds of billions in annual funding for social service, health, and 
education programs.40 A severe undercount would effectively starve 
vulnerable communities of funding for essential programs like Medicaid, 
children’s health programs, and Title I for elementary and secondary 
schools.41 And as Professor Justin Levitt has explained, “[t]he nature of this 
loss . . . has substantial ripple effects”: 
 
35. New York, 351 F. Supp. 3d at 584. 
36. See J. David Brown et al., “Predicting the Effect of Adding a Citizenship 
Question to the 2020 Census” (June 2019), 
https://apps.npr.org/documents/document.html?id=6165808-U-S-Census-
Bureau-Working-Paper-Understanding. 
37. Politico, Here’s who we think will win the 2020 elections in New Jersey, (Nov. 19, 
2019) (last updated July 6, 2020) https://www.politico.com/2020-
election/race-forecasts-and-predictions/new-jersey/. 
38. New York, 351 F. Supp. 3d at 594. 
39. Id. at 595. 
40. See id. at 596 (“In [FY2016] at least 320 such programs allocated about $900 
billion using census-derived data.”); see also Andrew Reamer, “Counting for 
Dollars 2020: The Role of the Decennial census decennial census decennial 
census in the Geographic Distribution of Federal Funds,” Report of the George 
Washington University Inst. of Public Policy (Nov. 2019) (placing figure for 
2017 as high as $1.5 trillion), https://perma.cc/48YZ-9WXT. 
41. New York, 351 F. Supp. 3d at 596-97. 
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When vulnerable populations do not respond to the census, it is not 
just the vulnerable populations who suffer. Everyone in an area 
with an undercount loses clout and cash. Immigrant farmworkers 
lose—and so do the rural agricultural communities dependent on 
those farmworkers. Urban minorities lose—and so do the suburbs 
that depend on those cities’ economic agencies. . . . We are firmly 
tethered to each other by the enumeration.42 
Ultimately, Secretary Ross’s decision would have drastically reduced 
the political influence of the same people whose voting rights the 
Administration claimed to want to protect,43 lending obvious, 
commonsense reasons to be skeptical of the Trump Administration’s newly-
professed commitment to the VRA. And so it was. Litigation quickly revealed 
that the VRA enforcement rationale was a fraud to veil the Trump 
Administration’s true goal of harming communities of color. 
A. Evidence that VRA enforcement was not the real reason for adding a 
citizenship question 
As the Supreme Court concluded in Department of Commerce, the 
litigation record left scant room for doubt that reasons other than the VRA 
drove the citizenship question decision, violating the basic requirement that 
an agency “must ‘disclose the basis of its action.’”44 Secretary Ross first took 
steps to add the question “about a week into his tenure,” but no 
contemporaneous evidence gave even a “hint” that he “consider[ed] VRA 
enforcement in connection with that project.”45 In fact, Secretary Ross did 
the opposite, ignoring the advice of Census Bureau technical advisors that 
 
42. Levitt, supra note 29, at 1373. 
43. At the time of trial and Supreme Court argument, the Census Bureau estimated 
that a citizenship question would cause an increase in non-response rate of 
noncitizen households by 5.8 percent. See New York, 351 F. Supp. 3d at 533 
n.14. Yet, days before the Supreme Court issued its decision, the Census 
Bureau revised its estimate, finding that the question would reduce census 
responses in noncitizen households by 8 percent, June Brown memo 
https://www2.census.gov/ces/wp/2019/CES-WP-19-18.pdf—constituting 
about 9 million people. 
44. Dep’t of Commerce, 139 S. Ct. at 2573 (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. 
United States, 371 U.S. 156, 167-69 (1962)). 
45. Id. at 2575. 
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other data found in administrative records “better met” VRA-related goals,46 
and of six former Bureau Directors from bipartisan administrations who 
wrote to say that adding the question at such a late date in the process 
would “put the . . . success of the census in all communities at grave risk.”47 
Nor could Secretary Ross’s senior staff later confirm that the VRA drove the 
decision to add a citizenship question. At deposition, Earl Comstock, the 
Department’s then-Director of Policy and Ross’s then-chief advisor on the 
census, testified that he never understood the Secretary’s actual 
justification for the citizenship question, and that he always saw his task as 
helping him “find the best rationale”—whether or not it was “legally 
valid.”48 
Of course, Secretary Ross claimed that it was DOJ who requested the 
citizenship question’s addition with VRA enforcement in mind. But the 
tortured history of the DOJ “request” proved even more telling. In May 
2017—seven months before DOJ eventually reached out to Commerce—
Secretary Ross wrote his senior staff that he was “mystified” that his 
“months old request” to add a citizenship question had gone nowhere.49 In 
response, Comstock promised to “work with Justice to get them to request” 
the citizenship question,50 and later testified that he set out to “find an 
[executive] agency that would have . . . reason to request a citizenship 
question,”51 only to be rebuffed by multiple agencies. Notably, Comstock 
pitched the request to DOJ’s Executive Office for Immigration Review and 
the Department of Homeland Security, neither of which had any 
responsibility to enforce the VRA.52 Eventually “out of patience” with his 
staff’s failed attempts to recruit another agency, Secretary Ross “contact[ed] 
[then-]Attorney General [Jeff] Sessions directly.”53 It was only then that DOJ 
communicated its newly-discovered need for additional citizenship 
information to discharge its VRA enforcement duties. 
 
46. New York, 351 F. Supp. 3d at 533-34. 
47. Letter from Former Census Bureau Directors to Sec’y Wilbur L. Ross, Jr., Dep’t 
of Commerce (Jan. 26, 2018), https://perma.cc/9E3J-MAM4. 
48. New York, 351 F. Supp. 3d at 569. 
49. Id. at 550. 
50. Id. at 567-68. 
51. Id. at 551 (internal quotations omitted). 
52. Id. at 551-52. 
53. Id. at 554. 
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B. Evidence that the real reason was to harm communities of color 
Something was obviously rotten in the Department of Commerce, and—
in Chief Justice Roberts’s words—nothing obliged the Court to “‘exhibit a 
naiveté from which ordinary citizens are free.’”54 In his summation, the 
sheer “incongruence” between Secretary’s Ross’s explanation for agency 
action and the record confirmed that the stated VRA rationale for the 
citizenship question was “a distraction,” not a reasoned “explanation for 
agency action.”55 But a distraction from what? As advocates, we can connect 
the many dots that the Court left untouched. And properly considered, there 
is no room for doubt that the Trump Administration acted to diminish the 
political power and influence of the diverse communities in which the 
plaintiffs we were privileged to represent reside and thrive. The citizenship 
question would clearly have done that by depressing the census response 
of members of those communities, ensuring that millions went uncounted 
and underrepresented. And, as discussed infra, it would have also served 
the parallel purpose of collecting the kind of granular information that many 
proponents of excluding noncitizens from states’ redistricting counts 
believe is needed to successfully do so. 
The evidence is overwhelming and only briefly surveyed here. To start, 
in April 2018, in a meeting brokered by then-White House Chief Strategist 
Stephen Bannon,56 Secretary Ross spoke about a citizenship question with 
then-Kansas Secretary of State Kris Kobach. Kobach—a self-proclaimed 
“advise[r] [to] the President”57 who touted a citizenship question “so 
Congress [can] consider excluding illegal aliens from the apportionment 
process”58—wrote Secretary Ross three months later to say that the lack of 
a citizenship question “leads to the problem that aliens . . . are still counted 
 
54. Dep’t of Commerce, 139 S. Ct. at 2575 (quoting United States v. Stanchich, 550 
F.2d 1294, 1300 (2d Cir. 1985). 
55. Dep’t of Commerce, 139 S. Ct. at 2575-76. 
56. New York, 351 F. Supp. 3d at 549-50. 
57. Pilar Pedraza (@PilarPedrazaTV), Twitter (Jul. 8, 2019, 2:21 PM), 
https://twitter.com/PilarPedrazaTV/status/1148296028854112256. 
58. Kris W. Kobach, Bring The Citizenship Question Back to the Census, BREITBART 




for congressional apportionment purposes.”59 Kobach did not mention the 
VRA, or any other reasons to add the question to the census.60 
But it was Commerce’s connection to a less well-known figure that 
produced the most incriminating evidence of discriminatory animus, and it 
was only by chance that lawyers suing the Administration came upon it. In 
late May 2019—more than a month after Supreme Court oral argument—
plaintiffs’ lawyers in an unrelated state court lawsuit challenging North 
Carolina’s state legislative map unearthed new, stunning evidence that 
should have been disclosed in discovery in Department of Commerce.61 
The evidence concerned Dr. Thomas Hofeller, the “Michelangelo of 
[Republican] gerrymandering.”62 A giant behind-the-scenes figure in 
Republican politics, Hofeller was “good friends” for about 30 years with 
Mark Neuman, Secretary Ross’s “trusted” and “expert adviser” on census 
issues.63 He also communicated regularly and directly with Christa Jones, a 
senior official at the Census Bureau who participated in the decision to add 
a citizenship question. 
In fall 2015, a conservative news outlet commissioned Hofeller to 
perform a study on the political and demographic effects of using of CVAP 
instead of total population (“TPOP”) data for apportionment purposes. 
Hofeller’s study concluded the obvious: excising noncitizens from the 
redistricting population base “would be advantageous to Republicans and 
Non-Hispanic Whites,”64 and would “clearly” disadvantage Democrats, 
 
59. 351 F. Supp. 3d at 552. 
60. Id. 
61. In September 2019, a three-judge panel of the Wake County Superior Court 
struck down North Carolina’s legislative map as a partisan gerrymander that 
violated the state’s constitution, and ordered that new maps be drawn for the 
2020 election. See Common Cause v. Lewis, No. 18-CVS-14001 (N.C. Super. 
Sept. 3, 2019), http://www.commoncause.org/north-carolina/wp-
content/uploads/sites/22/2019/09/Common-Cause-v.-Lewis-trial-court-
decision-9.3.19.pdf. 
62. Michael Wines, Drives Reveal New Details on the Census Citizenship Question, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 30, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/30/us/census-citizenship-question-
hofeller.html. 
63. See Letter Resp. to Pls.’ Oct. 28 Letter Mot., State of New York v. Dep’t of 
Commerce, No. 18-cv-2921, Dkt. No. 451 at 3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2018). 
64. See Letter Mot. to Show Cause at 55-63, State of New York v. Dep’t of Commerce, 
No. 1:18-cv-2921-JMF, Dkt. No. 587-1 (S.D.N.Y. May 30, 2019), 
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because jurisdictions with large immigrant communities have historically 
favored Democratic candidates.65 As a result, Hofeller surmised that the 
change would “provoke a high degree of resistance from Democrats and the 
major minority groups in the nation.”66 Ultimately, however, he determined 
that it would be “functionally unworkable” to use citizen population, rather 
than total population, for redistricting purposes without a citizenship 
question on the 2020 census form.67 
In August 2017, Hofeller prepared a document that outlined a VRA 
enforcement rationale for a citizenship question to be added to the 2020 
census. A full paragraph from that document found its way verbatim into a 
draft of a letter that Secretary Ross’s Census advisor Mark Neuman gave DOJ 
in October 2017. This draft letter served as the basis for the final letter that 
DOJ sent Commerce just a month later requesting a citizenship question. 
These documents, in other words, suggested a clear link between Hofeller, 
DOJ, and Secretary Ross. None of them were produced, disclosed, or listed 
in a privilege log during the Department of Commerce litigation. And 
ultimately, in May 2020, the district court acknowledged that a “striking” 
similarity between Neuman’s draft and the paragraph found in Hofeller’s 
computer “suggested coordination” between the two, even if it did not rise 
to “clear and convincing” evidence that DOJ misled the Court.68  The court 
sanctioned DOJ for its woefully deficient conduct in discovery, which 
resulted in DOJ attorneys “[a]t best . . . fail[ing] to produce more than ten 
percent of the documents that [they] were required to produce as part of 




65. NYIC Pls.’ Mot. for Sanctions at 4-5, State of New York v. Dep’t of Commerce, No. 
18-cv-02921, Dkt. No. 635 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2019). 
66. Id. 
67. Id. at 4. 
68 Op. & Order, State of New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, No. 18-cv-02921, ECF 
No. 694, at 13 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2020).   
69 Id. at 22.  While the district court denied Plaintiffs’ request for sanctions on their 
“most serious allegations—i.e., that Defendants concealed evidence and that two 
witnesses provided false testimony”—it stressed that it did not do so “on a finding 
that Plaintiffs’ troubling allegations are wrong,” but because “even if Plaintiffs’ 
allegations [were] accurate, that would not have changed the outcome of the 
litigation.”  Id. at 2.   
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And there was more. In November 2019, more than a year after the close 
of discovery, the House Oversight Committee made public a series of 
documents and communications that Mark Neuman produced to 
congressional investigators.70 These communications fell squarely within 
the scope of documents that government defendants in the citizenship 
question cases should have disclosed, whether as part of the agency’s 
administrative record or in follow-up court-ordered discovery. They 
revealed that Neuman, Secretary Ross’s adviser, directly sought and 
received the blessing of Hofeller and a close associate before supplying DOJ 
with an opening draft of the letter that Commerce would eventually hold up 
as the genesis of the VRA rationale, and that Hofeller had been working to 
add a citizenship question to the census as early as 2014 in order to aid “the 
Republican redistricting effort.”71 For months, defendants in the 
Department of Commerce lawsuit had dismissed plaintiffs’ raising of 
Hofeller’s obvious role in Secretary Ross’s decision as a “conspiracy 
theory.”72 Those claims always rang hollow but were now farcical. 
In any event, by then, lawyers’ claims in court had been overtaken by 
the Administration’s public statements. As has become common practice, 
the President and his political allies themselves would ultimately say the 
quiet part out loud and in public. Days after the Supreme Court’s decision, 
President Trump said that adding a citizenship question was “very 
important to find out if someone is a citizen as opposed to an illegal.”73 
Similarly, top Trump campaign aides around this time said that the attempt 
to block a citizenship question shows that “Democrats are desperate to help 
as many illegals as possible get into our country,”74 and that it would “give 
 
70. Memorandum from Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney to Members of 
the Comm. on Oversight & Reform, Update on Investigations of Census 
Citizenship Question Since House Held Attorney General Barr and Commerce 




72 Def’s Resp. to Mot. for Sanctions, State of New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, No. 
18-cv-02921, ECF No. 601, at 5 (S.D.N.Y. June 3, 2020). 
73. Remarks by President Trump at Signing of H.R. 3401, (July 1, 2019), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-
trump-signing-h-r-3401/. 
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[Democrats] the electoral advantage when it comes to the distribution of 
congressmen and they want more of that.”75 And more recently, President 
Trump justified his new plan to exclude undocumented immigrants from 
apportionment on the grounds that “illegal aliens” were gaining power at 
the expense of American citizens.76 
Pick a door, any door: all signs point squarely at a desire to rig the rules 
to harm communities of color. But if we are to understand the still-present 
threat facing marginalized communities, it is vital to understand a second—
but connected—reason why Secretary Ross, Hofeller, and central players in 
the Trump Administration thought that a citizenship question would help 
them achieve their goal. 
III. THE EVENWEL GAMBIT 
As noted, a close read of the Administration’s litigation conduct in the 
citizenship question case and all available evidence suggests that two 
related, but ultimately separate, goals were in play behind the citizenship 
question. The Administration’s more straightforward goal—central to 
litigation and well-covered in the media—was to reduce self-response rates 
among noncitizens and people in immigrant communities because, as 
Secretary Ross himself stated, they “may not feel comfortable answering” 
the question.77 Successful challenges by ACLU-represented plaintiffs and 
others kept a citizenship question off the 2020 census. And current 
litigation by ACLU-represented plaintiffs aims to block the latest effort to 
decrease and discourage census participation by undocumented people, 
their families, and members of their communities.  
Still, there is no doubt that the abortive citizenship question stood in 
service of a second, less well-known or covered but perhaps more central 
goal: to achieve the use of citizen voting age population data (again, CVAP) 
as a redistricting population base. Put simply, the Administration sought to 
enable complicit states to erase noncitizens from the count used to draw 
legislative districts. This somewhat more inside-baseball rationale was 
 
75. Fox News, (July 8, 2019) 
https://www.mediamatters.org/embed/clips/2019:07:08:66943:fnc-
revolution-20190707-pierson-census. 
76       See, e.g., President Donald Trump, Statement from the President Regarding                                                                         
Apportionment (July 21, 2020), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/statement-president-regarding-apportionment/. 
77. Hearing to Review the FY2019 Budget Request for the U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 
Hr’g Before S. Subcomm. on Commerce, Justice, Sci. & Related Agencies, 115 
Cong. (May 10, 2018) (testimony by Wilbur Ross, Sec. of Commerce). 
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certainly the focus of Dr. Thomas Hofeller’s work—it was, after all, the 
purpose of his smoking gun 2015 study—and has been the Administration’s 
fixation since its defeat at the Supreme Court. It is also discriminatory78 and 
would do nothing less than “fundamentally rewrite the terms of American 
representation.”79 
A. “One-person, one-vote” and the push to use CVAP as a redistricting 
base 
Evenwel established, “States use total-population numbers from the 
census when designing congressional and state-legislative districts.”80 
People, not eligible voters, are what matters.81 That norm derives from the 
post-Civil War Fourteenth Amendment’s directive that the total number of 
congressional representatives must be “apportioned among the several 
States” based on “the whole number of persons in each.”82 But even at the 
founding, when only a fraction of people—chiefly adult white men—could 
vote,83 Congress was still understood to represent all persons, including 
children, women, and even enslaved persons.84 “Restrictions on the 
franchise left large groups of citizens . . . unable to cast ballots, yet the 
Framers understood that these citizens were nonetheless entitled to 
 
78. Kravitz, 382 F. Supp. at 400. 
79. Levitt, supra note 29, at 1390. 
80. Evenwel, 136 S. Ct. at 1124. 
81. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 15 (1964) (“Numbers . . . ’are the only 
proper scale of representation.’” (quoting the Federalist No. 54 (Madison))). 
82. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (emphasis added). 
83. See Alexander Keyssar, The Right to Vote: The Contested History of Democracy 
in the United States 21 (2000) (“By 1790, according to most estimates, roughly 
60 to 70 percent of adult white men (and very few others) could vote.”). 
84. See Garza v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763, 774 (9th Cir. 1990) (“The 
framers were aware that th[e] apportionment and representation base would 
include categories of persons who were ineligible to vote—women, children, 
bound servants, convicts, the insane, and, at later times, aliens.”); Joseph 
Fiskin, Taking Virtual Representation Seriously, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1681, 
1706 (2018) (noting “Americans in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries” 
“[i]deologically . . . opposed virtual representation” but “[i]n reality, both 
before and after the Revolution, most of the representation in the United 
States was, in fact, virtual”). 
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representation in government.”85 Thus, by design, the number of people, not 
voters, has always been the relevant building block to American 
democracy.86 (Indeed, the Fourteenth Amendment corrected the glaring 
and loathsome exception that counted enslaved persons as “three-fifths” of 
all others, perversely inflating slave states’ political power as a result.87) 
At the same time, since the 1960s the Supreme Court has interpreted 
another provision of the Fourteenth Amendment—its Equal Protection 
Clause—to hold that intrastate redistricting must also “be apportioned on a 
 
85. Evenwel, 136 S. Ct. at 1127 n.8. 
86. The Fourteenth Amendment’s legislative history is clear on the point, as the 
Court explained in Evenwel. See id. at 1128 (“no one will deny that population 
is the true basis of representation; for women, children, and other non-voting 
classes may have as vital an interest in the legislation of the country as those 
who actually deposit the ballot”) (quoting Maine Rep. James G. Blaine); id. 
(“what becomes of that large class of non-voting tax-payers that are found in 
every section? Are they in no matter to be represented? They certainly should 
be enumerated in making up the whole number of those entitled to a 
representative”) (quoting New York Rep. Hamilton Ward); id. (“[n]umbers, 
not voters; numbers, not property; this is the theory of the Constitution”) 
(quoting Michigan Sen. Jacob Howard). 
87. See Evenwel, 136 S. Ct. at 1145 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(“[T]he [three fifths] clause gave the slave States more power in the House and 
in the electoral college than they would have enjoyed if only free persons had 
been counted.”); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 27 (1964) (Harlan, J. 
dissenting) (Since no slave voted, the inclusion of three-fifths of their number 
in the basis of apportionment gave the favored States representation far in 
excess of their voting population.”); see also Gabriel J. Chin, Reconstruction, 
Felon Disenfranchisement, and the Right to Vote: Did the Fifteenth Amendment 
Repeal Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment?, 92 GEO. L.J. 259, 265 n.38 
(2004) (“Fractionalization of African-Americans . . . helped . . . anti-slave 
interests; a two-fifths or lesser compromise would have been better because 
it would have further reduced the power of slave interests in Congress.”). 
 Of course, this arrangement was not just dehumanizing, it was also 
undemocratic to its core. Slave states’ representatives in Congress did not 
speak for enslaved persons’ interests at all. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, Who 
Counts? Sez Who?, 58 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 937, 939-40 (2014) (noting slaves “might 
[have] ‘count[ed]’ as part of the ‘apportionment census,’ but no one imagined 
that they would, in fact, ‘count’ as part of the community whose opinions or 
interests would ever be taken into account”); see also AKHIL REED AMAR, 
AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 92 (2005) (“[M]asters did not as a rule 
claim to virtually represent the best interests of their slaves.”). 
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population basis.”88 At bottom, this “one person, one vote” rule means that 
districts must be “as nearly of equal population as is practicable.”89 
Anything less would give voters in smaller districts undue political weight,90 
so legislative districts must contain a roughly equal number of people.91 And 
while the Court has been less clear on whether a different benchmark than 
total population could ever be used to draw state or municipal legislative 
districts,92 it has repeatedly affirmed the “basic constitutional standard” 
contemplating “equal representation for equal numbers of people.”93 
As a practical matter, this “basic constitutional standard” is not just 
consistent with constitutional tradition and historical practice, but sound. 
The use of total population as a basis for redistricting “promotes equitable 
and effective representation.”94 It dovetails with the command to apportion 
congressional representatives based on the “whole number of persons in 
each state,” which Professor Levitt has explained: 
[i]mplies that congressional representatives have the authority 
(and perhaps obligation) to represent all of their constituents; that 
all individuals within a polity deserve to be represented . . .; that the 
wishes of the minority of the governed should not prevail over the 
wishes of the majority; and that constituents’ various concerns have 
roughly equal claims on the representatives’ time and attention . . . 
such that 50,000 individuals aren’t jostling for one representative’s 
 
88. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964). 
89. Id. at 577. 
90. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 18 (1964). 
91. Id. The Court has acknowledged that “some deviations from population 
equality may be necessary,” and has explained that “minor deviations” of up 
to ten percent are presumptively permissible. Brown v. Thompson, 462 U.S. 
835, 842 (1983). 
92. See Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 91 (1966) (“At several points in 
[Reynolds], we discussed substantial equivalence in terms of voter population 
or citizen population, making no distinction between the acceptability of such 
a test and a test based on total population.”). 
93. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 568, 560-61 (emphasis added); see also Bd. of Estimate v. 
Morris, 489 U.S. 688, 693-94 (1989); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 748-
49 (1973); Avery v. Midland Cty., 390 U.S. 474, 478 (1968); Burns, 384 U.S. at 
91. 
94. Evenwel, 136 S. Ct. at 1132. 
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efforts in one state while 500,000 individuals seek face time from 
one representative . . . next door.95 
Demographically, however, many on the right of the American political 
landscape increasingly view the use of total population as the basis for 
redistricting as a problem. From the 1960s onwards, “social conservatives 
migrated geographically and politically towards the Republican Party while 
African-American and Latino voters increasingly coalesced with liberal 
white Democrats.”96 These two coalitions have only grown more polarized 
over time, “pitting a predominantly white Republican party against a 
racially diverse Democratic one.”97 They are also acutely geographically 
concentrated, with polarization between rural, more homogeneously-white 
communities increasingly at one end of the political spectrum, with more 
diverse urban centers at the other end.98 
Against this backdrop, conservative redistricting thought leaders have 
been increasingly alarmed by patterns of non-white immigration into the 
United States over the past half-century. “As Latinos—and to a lesser extent, 
Asians—entered the country, many ended up residing in cities, following 
jobs and available low income housing stock.”99 The nationwide result is 
that urban, heavily Democratic districts now almost invariably have higher 
rates of noncitizen residents who are ineligible to vote than Republican-
leaning ones. Conservative experts like the late Hofeller have increasingly 
pushed for the use of CVAP as a population basis to counter this trend’s 
effect on redistricting, because “[t]he transparent political stakes of 
counting only eligible voters would be to suppress the voting power of 
urban areas with large populations of noncitizens and . . . shift power from 
Democrats to Republicans.”100 As commentators like Michael Li of the 
Brennan Center have explained, however, this shift would come at a terrible 
democratic cost: a switch to CVAP would “take representation away from 
the . . . areas where most Americans live” and doubtlessly “re-create the 
 
95. Levitt, supra note 29, at 1391. 
96. Bruce E. Cain & Emily R. Zhang, Blurred Lines: Conjoined Polarization and 
Voting Rights, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 867, 868-69 (2016). 
97. Id. at 869. 
98. See id. at 875-76; Wendy K. Tam Cho et al., Voter Migration and the Geographic 
Sorting of the American Electorate, 103 ANNALS ASS’N AM. GEOGRAPHERS 856, 
857-60 (2012). 
99. Cain & Zhang, supra note 96, at 876. 
100. Daryl J. Levinson, The Supreme Court 2015 Term, Foreword: Looking for Power 
in Public Law, 130 HARV. L. REV. 33, 42 (2016). 
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disparities that existed before the Supreme Court’s reapportionment 
revolution of the 1960s.”101 
B. Evenwel v. Abbott, the post-Evenwel landscape, and the 2020 census 
In 2014, a group of Texas plaintiffs who lived in rural counties with 
relatively high rates of eligible voters challenged the state’s 2010 
redistricting plan. Their claim alleged that their votes were improperly 
diluted as compared to districts with greater numbers of nonvoters—many 
of whom were noncitizens.102 Accordingly, the plaintiffs asked the courts to 
hold that equal protection principles required local legislative redistricting 
to be keyed to the number of eligible voters, not residents, in a given district. 
The lower court rejected their argument.103 
In Evenwel v. Abbott, the Supreme Court conclusively rejected the 
argument that states must, as a constitutional matter, equalize districts’ 
voting population “for purposes of the one-person, one-vote rule.”104 The 
Court largely relied on the unbroken constitutional history—starting with 
the founding and reinforced by the Fourteenth Amendment—of using total 
population to apportion representation in the House of Representatives 
among the states.105 Justice Ginsburg’s opinion then surveyed past decisions 
to conclude that the Court’s guiding theory in its “one-person, one-vote” 
cases was one of “equality of representation, not voter equality.”106 And 
finally, the Evenwel Court cited the longstanding “settled practice” of all fifty 
states in using total population as a basis for redistricting, which only 
confirmed its validity.107 
 
101. Michael Li, Brennan Center for Justice, America’s Historic Fight Over Who 
Deserves Representation (July 18, 2019) 
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/americas-
historic-fight-over-who-deserves-representation. 
102. See 136 S. Ct. at 1129. 
103. See Evenwel v. Perry, No. 14-cv-335, 2014 WL 5780507, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 
5, 2014). 
104. Brief for Appellants at 26, Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120 (2015) (No. 14-
940) 2015 WL 4624625. 
105. See Evenwel, 136 S. Ct. at 1127. 
106. Id. at 1130-31. 
107. See id. at 1132-33 (“Adopting voter-eligible apportionment as constitutional 
command would upset a well-functioning approach to districting that all 50 
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The Court in Evenwel stopped short of deciding whether states “may 
draw districts to equalize voter-eligible population rather than total 
population.”108 Indeed, doing so “would have been a substantial expansion 
of the question presented.”109 But it doubtlessly came close to endorsing the 
“singular propriety of an equal representation theory for state legislative 
redistricting,”110 for example, by affirming the foundational norm that 
“representatives serve all residents, not just those eligible or registered to 
vote.”111 
Another likely obstacle to CVAP-based redistricting emerged in the 
Evenwel litigation: both proponents and detractors alike considered 
available citizenship data—usually collected through the ACS—”insufficient 
for equalizing the number of voters in each district.”112 Most redistricting is 
done using data at the “census-block” level, the smallest unit of geography 
that the  decennial census count measures.113 However, in part because the 
ACS only offers a five-year rolling “sample” of approximately 2.5 percent of 
the U.S. population, the Census Bureau does not produce or release 
estimates with census-block granularity.114 As a result, amici argued that 
the “constitutional requirement mandating that states draw legislative 
districts” using CVAP that the plaintiffs sought was “impossible to 
accurately implement using currently available data.”115 And Texas only 
 
States and countless local jurisdictions have followed for decades, even 
centuries.”). 
108. Id. at 1133. 
109. Levitt, supra note 29 at 1395. 
110. Id. 
111. Evenwel, at 1132. 
112. Levitt, supra note 29 at 1394. 
113. See Brief of Nathaniel Persily et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellees at 
23-24, Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120 (2015) (No. 14-940), 2015 WL 
5719746; see also id. at 21 (“Census blocks ‘nest’ in all other levels of census 
geography, such as block groups, tracts, county subdivisions, and counties. 
. . . [t]hey are the atoms, in other words, out of which all other data 
aggregations are produced.”). 
114. See Levitt, supra note 29 at 1378. 
115. Brief of Former Directors of the U.S. Census Bureau as Amici Curiae in Support 
of Appellees at 13, Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120 (2015) (No. 14-940) 2015 
WL 5675832. Although it had not been made public at the time, the 2015 
Hofeller study that was later revealed in litigation endorsed this view, stating: 
“ACS data are simply not available for [census voting districts] and any 
estimates of CVAP populations for [those districts] would be even more 
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tepidly defended the use of total population to redistrict by claiming that its 
“choice to rely upon census data”116—”the most reliable population data 
currently available”117—was “permissible.”118 
Even if these arguments were likely correct as a practical matter, they 
might be gratuitous following the Court’s opinion in Evenwel. As noted 
supra, a central rationale of Evenwel is the principle that representatives 
serve all constituents, not just those who vote.119 If that is true, then the level 
of granularity of the citizenship information available should be immaterial: 
all residents of a given district—even nonvoting immigrants—should count 
for redistricting purposes. 
Still,  Hofeller believed that states’ use of CVAP as a redistricting basis—
which he acknowledged was a “radical departure from the federal ‘one 
person, one vote’ rule”120—was possible, but only if the census could be 
used to collect more granular data on citizenship.121 The gambit’s spoils 
were too alluring: an entrenched redistricting “advantage[] to Republicans 
and Non-Hispanic Whites.”122 Accordingly, and notwithstanding the dim 
prospects of CVAP-based redistricting after Evenwel,123 he and senior 
Trump Administration officials deployed the VRA as a smokescreen. And at 
each step of the way in litigation, the Secretary of Commerce and other 
government defendants vehemently denied that they sought to undermine 
 
inaccurate than the ACS estimates for Census Tracts or Block Groups.”). Letter 
Motion to Show Cause at 55-63, State of New York v. Dep’t of Commerce, No. 
1:18-cv-2921-JMF, Dkt. No. 587-1 (S.D.N.Y. May 30, 2019), 
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6077735-May-30-2019-
Exhibit.html#document/p63/a504019. 
116. Brief for Appellees 50, Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120 (2015) (No. 14-940) 
2015 WL 5562189. 
117. Id. at 51. 
118. Id. at 50. 
119. See Evenwel, 136 S. Ct. at 1132 (“Nonvoters have an important stake in many 
policy debates . . . and in receiving constituent services, such as help 
navigating public-benefits bureaucracies.”). 
120. Letter Motion to Show Cause at 55-63, State of New York v. Dep’t of Commerce, 
No. 1:18-cv-2921-JMF, Dkt. No. 587-1, at 9 (S.D.N.Y. May 30, 2019), 
https://www.commoncause.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/2015-
Hofeller-Study.pdf. 
121. See id. 
122. Id. 
123. See id. at 4. 
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the political weight of districts home to large immigrant communities, or 
that the citizenship question had anything to do at all with redistricting.124 
Even those flimsy denials, however, fell away in the wake of the 
Supreme Court’s June 27, 2019 decision in Department of Commerce. 
Abruptly changing course, the Trump Administration and its advisers 
enthusiastically leaned into the redistricting rationale they fiercely 
disavowed for close to two years. On July 5, 2019, President Trump, asked 
why he was still trying to put a citizenship question on the census, stated: 
“Number one, you need it for Congress. You need it for Congress, for 
districting. You need it for appropriations. Where are the funds going? How 
many people are there?”125 Days later, the President stated that gathering 
citizenship information is “relevant to administering our elections. Some 
states may want to draw state and local legislative districts based upon the 
voter-eligible population.”126 And Attorney General William Barr 
acknowledged that citizenship data “may be relevant to [] considerations” 
pending resolution of disputes over “whether illegal aliens can be included 
for apportionment purposes.”127 On July 11, 2019, President Trump issued 
 
124. See, e.g., Pets.’ Opp. to MYIC Resps’ Mot. for Limited Remand, Dep’t of 
Commerce v. New York, No. 18-966 (dismissing assertion that Thomas Hofeller 
played key role in developing citizenship question and VRA rationale as a 
“conspiracy theory [that] is implausible on its face”); see also, e.g., Michael 
Wines, Charges of Politics in Census Debate Are ‘Smoke and Mirrors,’ Justice 
Dept. Says, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/03/us/census-citizenship-question-
hofeller.html. 
125 Remarks by President Trump Before Marine One Departure, White House (July 
5, 2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-
trumpmarine-one-departure-51/). 
126. Remarks by President Trump on Citizenship and the Census, White House 
(July 11, 2019) https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-
president-trumpcitizenship-census/. As the Department of Commerce trial court 
later noted in a May 2020 sanctions order, this “decision . . . recognized what 
Plaintiffs had been arguing all along over Defendants’ strenuous objection: that 
collecting citizenship data [from other agencies] would be ‘far more accurate’ than 
adding a citizenship question to the census questionnaire and would yield ‘an even 
more complete count of citizens than through asking the single question alone.’”  
Opinion and Order, New York v. Dep’t of Commerce, No. 18-cv-02921, ECF No. 694, 
at 4 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2020) (quoting https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/ 
remarks-president-trump-citizenship-census/). 
127. Macagnone & Ruger, supra note 119. Executive Order 13880, captioned 
“Collecting Information about Citizenship Status in Connection with the 
Decennial census decennial census decennial census” (“EO 13880”), is 
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an order that expressly stated that the Administration sought to allow 
“States to design . . . legislative districts based on the population of vote-
eligible citizens.”128 
Post-judgment, in other words, the Administration embraced its 
Evenwel-inspired rationale as often as it could and to anyone who would 
listen. While Department of Commerce has foreclosed a citizenship question 
appearing on the 2020 census, the decision has not at all hindered the effort 
to use CVAP as a redistricting base. And proponents of using CVAP to 
decimate representation of resident noncitizens and other non-voters in 
this redistricting cycle are emboldened. In the days before President Trump 
issued his executive order on citizenship data, 19 Republican members of 
the House of Representatives wrote Attorney General Barr, in part, to affirm 
their belief that “citizenship is [] germane to carrying out our duty to 
apportion representatives.”129 The State of Alabama has sued the 
Administration claiming that including noncitizens in the final census 
numbers used for apportionment is itself unlawful;130 legislators in 
 
currently the subject of a pending lawsuit brought by civil rights 
organizations, including the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational 
Fund (MALDEF).  See La Unión del Pueblo Entero v. Ross, No. 19-cv-02710 (D. 
Md.) (“LUPE v. Ross”).  The LUPE plaintiffs claim EO 13880 aims to “enable 
states to subtract purported non-U.S. citizens from the population used to 
draw new political boundaries, thereby drastically reducing the political 
strength and representation of Latinos and others.”  Pls.’ Opp. to Defs.’ Mot. to 
Dismiss, LUPE v. Ross, No. 19-cv-02710, ECF No. 64, at 1 (D. Md. Jan. 9, 2020).  
And that the order “is a direct response to [defendants’] being thwarted in 
. . . ask[ing] a citizenship question of all people responding to the 2020 
Census.”  Id.    
128. Executive Order on Collecting Information about Citizenship Status in 
Connection with the Decennial census decennial census decennial census, The 
White House (July 11, 2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-
actions/executive-order-collecting-information-citizenship-status-
connection-decennial-census/. 
129. Letter from 19 Republican Members of the House of Representatives to 
William P. Barr, Att’y Gen. of the United States (July 10, 2019), 
https://roy.house.gov/sites/roy.house.gov/files/wysiwyg_uploaded/Barr%
20Letter%20With%20Signatures%20Two.pdf. 
130. In July 2018, various civil rights organizations, led by the Mexican American 
Legal Defense Fund (MALDEF), intervened as defendants, citing, in part, that 
“the current administration cannot be trusted to defend” against Alabama’s 
lawsuit. See Rafael Bernal, Latino groups intervene in Alabama census lawsuit, 
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Missouri and Nebraska have pushed legislation to exclude noncitizens from 
the redistricting process; and lawmakers in Arizona and Texas have 
indicated willingness to use citizenship data to do the same.131 And now, 
most notably, President Trump’s executive order aims to exclude altogether 
undocumented immigrants from the census count used to apportion 
congressional representatives. A year after its rebuke at the Supreme Court, 
the Administration persists, unabashed—with advocates in state 
legislatures vowing to continue the battle regardless of the results of the 
2020 election.    
In sum, despite the administration’s defeats in court, significant threats 
persist to the rights to representation of communities of color. It persists 
because the Trump Administration and various states’ elected officials have 
made it clear they will continue their efforts to halt or diminish minority 
communities’ growing political influence at a time when the census, “[i]f 
administered correctly,” should instead “etch a portrait of a new America 
whose future population is irreversibly racially and ethnically diverse.”132   
IV. MOVING FORWARD: WHAT THE CITIZENSHIP QUESTION AND EVENWEL BATTLES 
MEAN FOR LITIGATORS, ACTIVISTS, AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 
Though the Supreme Court’s decision blocking a citizenship question 
from appearing on the 2020 census was worthy of immediate celebration, 
the civil rights community knew better than to declare total victory—
something that proved prescient when the Administration announced its 
new apportionment policy a year later. The Supreme Court’s decision on the 
citizenship question was a vitally important, and perhaps improbable, 
victory for communities of color in an area of administrative law where the 
federal government is typically owed a tremendous amount of deference. 
And yet, the Administration’s push to get states to apportion based on CVAP 
data or outright exclude undocumented immigrants from the 
apportionment count, poses an active and serious threat to communities of 
 
THE HILL (July 12, 2018), https://thehill.com/latino/396678-latino-groups-
intervene-in-alabama-census-lawsuit. 
131. See Nick Brown, Republicans want census data on citizenship for redistricting, 
REUTERS (Apr. 8, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-census-
redistricting-insight/republicans-want-census-data-on-citizenship-for-
redistricting-idUSKCN1RK18D; see also David Daley, How to Get Away With 
Gerrymandering, SLATE (Oct. 2, 2019), https://slate.com/news-and-
politics/2019/10/alec-meeting-gerrymandering-audio-recording.html. 
132. Nelson, supra note 10. 
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color. Civil rights advocates and litigators must play a key role in preventing 
the census enumeration from being hijacked to prevent our democracy 
from reflecting our diversity. 
Accordingly, this section reflects on lessons the civil rights legal 
community can take from recent litigation on the citizenship question and 
argues that impact litigation was perhaps the only viable route to ensure 
that a citizenship question was removed from the 2020 decennial form. 
Then, we suggest a few things that activists and policymakers can do to 
combat the continued threat of exclusionary redistricting. 
A. The citizenship question case as a case study for the utility of civil 
rights impact litigation 
Speaking at a July 11, 2019 press conference in the Rose Garden, 
Attorney General Bill Barr seemed annoyed. It was two weeks after the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Department of Commerce and the 
Administration had not taken its defeat well, “vacillat[ing] over whether to 
persist in [its] efforts to include a citizenship question on the 2020 census 
questionnaire.”133 Initially, a few days after the decision, DOJ confirmed—
to a federal judge, plaintiffs’ attorneys, and the national media—that the 
citizenship question was dead.134 In no uncertain terms, Secretary Ross 
declared that “[t]he Census Bureau [would] start[] the process of printing 
the decennial questionnaires without the [citizenship] question.”135 But a 
day later, President Trump then did a whiplash-inducing about-face, 
tweeting on July 3 that “News Reports about the Department of Commerce 
 
133 Opinion and Order, New York v. Dep’t of Commerce, No. 18-cv-02921, ECF No. 
694, at 4 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2020). 
134. See Pls.’ Letter to Hon. Jesse Furman, State of New York v. Dep’t of Commerce, 
No. 19-cv-2921 (July 3, 2019), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legal-
work/Requeststatussconference_7.03.19.pdf; Hallie Jackson & Dartunorro 
Clark, Trump administration will print 2020 census without citizenship 
question, NBC NEWS (July 2, 2019), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news/trump-administration-
will-print-2020-census-without-citizenship-question-n1025971. 
135. Mike Schneider & Mark Sherman, 2020 Census to be printed without citizenship 
question, AP (July 3, 2019), 
https://apnews.com/9193a30c38c345a88997020b6b958d9f. 
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dropping . . . the Citizenship Question [are] FAKE!”136 He added: “We are 
absolutely moving forward, as we must” with a citizenship question. 
What followed was an absolute frenzy. Forced to explain to multiple 
courts why they could not close the book on litigation, government lawyers 
told the courts that the Administration had ordered a review of “all available 
options” for a “new decision” to put a citizenship question on the  decennial 
census.137 After vehemently asserting for close to two years that the VRA 
and the VRA alone motivated its decision on the citizenship question, the 
Administration publicly said it was going back to the drawing board. And it 
was doing so in the face of the fact that it had steadfastly asserted to the 
Supreme Court, three federal district courts, and two circuit courts of appeal 
that the Census Bureau had no choice but to finalize the  decennial census 
questionnaire by June 2019.138 After flirting with the idea of adding the 
citizenship question by executive order139—a clearly unlawful and likely 
unconstitutional act140—President Trump on July 11, 2019 held a speech in 
the Rose Garden to—actually, finally, really—concede. 
 
136. President Donald J. Trump, @realDonaldTrump, TWITTER (July 3, 2019, 
8:06AM), 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1146435093491277824. 
137. Defs.’ Letter to Hon. Jesse Furman, State of New York v. Dep’t of Commerce, No. 
19-cv-2921 (July 3, 2019), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legal-
work/LetterResponse_7.3.19.pdf. 
138. See Pls.’ Motion to Amend Judgment on Remand Pursuant to Rule 59(e), or For 
Injunctive Relief Pursuant to the All Writs Act 12, 13 n.5 (listing the large 
number of representations Defendants made regarding the June 2019 
deadline) (July 5, 2019) 
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/motion_to_amend
.pdf. 
139. See Michael Wines & Adam Liptak, Trump Considering an Executive Order to 
Allow Citizenship Question on Census, N.Y. TIMES (July 5, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/05/us/census-question.html. 
140. Adding a citizenship question by executive order would violate federal law for 
at least two clear reasons. First, it would violate the Census Act, which 
“delegate[s] to the Secretary of Commerce the task of conducting the 
decennial census decennial census decennial census ‘in such form and content 
as he may determine’”—not the President. Dep’t of Commerce, 139 S. Ct. at 
2561 (emphasis added) (quoting 13 U.S.C. § 141(a)); see also Dep’t of 
Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 321 (1999) 
(describing respective roles that Census Act assigns to President, Congress, 
and Secretary)decennial census decennial census decennial census. 
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President Trump, flanked by Secretary Ross and Attorney General Barr, 
spoke first. “The problem,” Attorney General Barr said, is not only that 
“there are injunctions currently in place that forbid adding the question,” 
but that “any new decision would be subject to immediate challenge as a 
new claim in the three ongoing district court cases.”141 “There is simply no 
way to litigate these issues and obtain relief from the current injunctions in 
time to implement any new decision without jeopardizing our ability to 
carry out the census,” Barr concluded.142 
In other words: we would have gotten away with it if not for those pesky 
lawyers. 
He was probably right. Consider the situation in March 2018, when 
Secretary Ross wrote his decisional memo authorizing a citizenship 
question. State legislatures or governors had no authority to prevent the 
Trump Administration from going through with it. There was no chance that 
Congress would pass legislation prohibiting a citizenship question and 
muster enough votes to override a presidential veto—why, after all, would 
Republican members challenge President Trump when it came to a move 
that was explicitly designed to help the “Republican redistricting effort”?143 
For this particular problem, the legislative process offered no real solution. 
The citizenship question fight is, in many ways, just one facet of one of 
the most important issues facing the United States. As political interests that 
have historically depended on a declining white majority face the prospect 
of a rapidly diversifying electorate, conservative activists have repeatedly 
opted to change the rules in their favor over including people of color in 
their vision for America. Ten states now have “strict” voter ID laws on the 
 
 Second, an executive order adding a citizenship question to the census would 
likely encroach on Congress’s authority, in violation of the separation of 
powers. Here, “Justice Jackson’s familiar tripartite scheme [in the “Steel 
Seizure” case] provides the [relevant] framework.” Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 
491, 524 (2008) (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 
635 (1952)). Because Congress, through the Census Act, delegated its 
constitutional authority to administer the census to the Commerce Secretary, 
not the President, presidential authority to directly alter its content by 
executive order is likely at its “lowest ebb.” Youngstown Sheet & Tube, 343 
U.S. at 638. Courts could only uphold such “exclusive Presidential control 
. . . by disabling the Congress from acting upon the subject.” Id. at 637-38. . As 
such, the President lacks authority to modify the content of the decennial 
census decennial census decennial census form through executive order 
141. Id. 
142. Id. 
143. Supra note 63, at 12. 
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books, meaning that voters without proper identification must return with 
appropriate ID within a short period of time after Election Day for their 
provisional ballots to be counted.144 These laws excessively and disparately 
burden minority voters, who are generally less likely to possess qualifying 
forms of identification.145 According to a Leadership Conference on Civil and 
Human Rights report,146 at least 1,688 polling places have closed in places 
formerly covered by Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act—a crucial safeguard 
against discriminatory voting practices that required certain jurisdictions 
to submit changes to election laws to federal “preclearance”—since the 
Supreme Court invalidated it under Shelby County v. Holder in 2013.147 At 
the same time, more states now routinely purge massive numbers of voters 
from the registration rolls, most frequently in jurisdictions formerly 
covered by Section 5.148 
The Trump Administration has not just embraced this trend; it has 
taken it to distressing and unprecedented heights. In addition to 
encouraging voter suppression through false claims about widespread 
voter fraud, President Trump has floated the (patently unconstitutional) 
 
144. Wendy Underhill, Nat. Conference of State Legislatures, Voter Identification 
Requirements (Feb. 24, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-
campaigns/voter-id.aspx. 
145. See, e.g., Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 265 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (holding 
Texas’s strict ID law violated VRA Section 2 for its discriminatory effect, where 
“Hispanic registered voters and Black registered voters were respectively 
195% and 305% more likely than their Anglo peers to lack [a qualifying] ID”). 
146. THE LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE EDUC. FUND, DEMOCRACY DIVERTED 12 (Sept. 2019), 
http://civilrightsdocs.info/pdf/reports/Democracy-Diverted.pdf. 
147. 570 U.S. 529 (2013). Under Section 5 of the VRA, certain “covered 
jurisdictions” with a history of voter suppression on racial grounds had to get 
federal approval—either from the Attorney General or the U.S. District Court 
for the District of Columbia—before enacting “voting qualification[s] or 
prerequisite[s] to voting, or standard[s], practice[s], or procedure[s] with 
respect to voting.” 52 U.S.C. § 10304(a). The Supreme Court in Shelby County 
effectively invalidated this preclearance process, because it found that the 
“coverage formula” that determined which jurisdictions were subject to 
Section 5 was unconstitutional. Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 557. 39% of the 757 
counties in formerly covered jurisdictions that the Leadership Conference 
studied closed polling places during this time. Id. 
148. Kevin Morris, Brennan Ctr. For Justice, Voter Purge Rates Remain High, 




idea of ending birthright citizenship in America149—a naked attempt to 
exclude the children of undocumented immigrants from the polity and 
prevent them from ever voting in the only country they have ever known. 
Kris Kobach, who advised Secretary Ross on adding a citizenship question, 
had his own documentary proof-of-citizenship law in Kansas struck 
down.150 These endeavors—as well as countless other voter suppression 
attempts in states across the country—disproportionately harm voters of 
color. 
Litigation can be a sub-optimal way to bring about change. It is costly; it 
often fails to generate mass political action; courts are typically reluctant or 
ill-equipped to deliver expansive remedies; and it largely depends on 
opponents playing fairly and by the rules. In the case of the citizenship 
question, litigation was also less than ideal because it did little to generate 
trust in government. It remains to be seen, for example, how significant of a 
problem census non-response in immigrant communities will be even 
without a citizenship question, because immigrant communities had heard 
about the push to add a question and may still feel intimidated, targeted, or 
scared.151 
Yet, the sorts of attacks on democracy embodied by the attempt to add 
a citizenship question constitute “discrimination . . . unlikely to be soon 
rectified by legislative means.”152 This is both because marginalized 
communities lack political power and because these attacks target their 
 
149. Julie Hirschfeld Davis, President Wants to Use Executive Order to End Birthright 
Citizenship, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/30/us/politics/trump-birthright-
citizenship.html. 
150. Fish v. Kobach, 189 F. Supp. 3d 1107 (D. Kan. 2016), aff’d, 840 F.3d 710 (10th 
Cir. 2016). Kobach, a close ally to President Trump, served as vice chair to the 
President’s now-defunct Presidential Advisory Commission on Election 
Integrity. President Trump founded the commission after alleging, without 
evidence, that millions of people voted illegally for Hillary Clinton in the 2016 
election such that she did not properly win the popular vote. Michael Tackett 
& Michael Wines, Trump Disbands Commission on voter Fraud, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 
3, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/03/us/politics/trump-voter-
fraud-commission.html. The commission, which produced no evidence of 
voter fraud and was the subject of multiple lawsuits, including one brought by 
the ACLU, abruptly disbanded in 2018. 
151. See infra Section IV.B. 
152. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). 
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political power or franchise in the first place.153 When local, state, or federal 
governments take away political power, it makes it harder for communities 
to remedy those harms through political means. Civil rights litigation, then, 
continues to have a vital role to play in combating attacks on our democracy 
and most vulnerable communities. 
Further, litigation provides an important investigative check on 
government malfeasance, and the information that legal battles bring to 
light plays a meaningful role in educating the public. In March 2018, no one, 
including the press, knew the full (and scandalous) story that undergirded 
the decision to add a citizenship question to the 2020 census was. Indeed, 
even lawyers challenging the decision—who firmly believed that the 
question’s purpose was to harm immigrant communities—had no reason to 
grasp the scope of the Trump Administration’s cover-up, or to know that 
Hofeller played a key role in developing its strategy. Much of the 
information that eventually came to light between Secretary Ross’s decision 
and the Administration’s loss at the Supreme Court was the result of 
litigation discovery. On that score, even a loss in court would have delivered 
government transparency and public education benefits. 
It is clear that the evidence produced during this litigation did have a 
crucial impact on the outcome. While Chief Justice Roberts stated that “the 
District Court should not have ordered extra-record discovery” as early as 
it did, the ultimately incomplete state of the administrative record “largely 
justified such extra-record discovery,” which Roberts relied on heavily in 
his ruling on pretext.154 After “review[ing] a record as extensive as the one 
before us,” Chief Justice Roberts stated, the Court simply could not “ignore 
the disconnect between the decision made and the explanation given.”155 To 
disregard all the evidence directly before the Court, the Chief said, would 
demonstrate unacceptable “naiveté” and render judicial review “an empty 
ritual.”156  
The Hofeller documents also may have played a role in the Court’s 
decision. The Supreme Court was well aware of the bombshell evidence that 
came out after oral argument—in part because DOJ told the Court about it 
in a fit of panic. While all three plaintiff groups won at the district courts, 
both New York and Maryland plaintiffs (initially) lost on their constitutional 
claim that the decision to add a citizenship question was unconstitutional 
 
153. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
154. Dep’t of Commerce, 139 S. Ct. at 2574. 
155. Id. at 2575. 
156. Id. at 2575-76. 
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and discriminatory. But the Hofeller documents shed new light on those 
claims. They showed that Hofeller authored part of the initial request asking 
the Commerce Department to add a citizenship question, in part because he 
considered the question would be “advantageous for Republicans and non-
Hispanic Whites.”157 Documents in hand, the Maryland plaintiffs asked the 
district court to reconsider its judgment or reopen the case for further fact-
finding on their intentional discrimination claim.158 The Maryland court 
agreed,159 and two days before the Supreme Court ruled in Department of 
Commerce, the Fourth Circuit allowed the district court to conduct 
additional factfinding.160 Crucially, that meant that even if the Supreme 
Court ruled against the plaintiffs in the New York case, vindication would 
elude the Trump Administration as new proceedings and discovery 
continued in Maryland federal court. 
Later that evening, the Solicitor General of the United States asked the 
Court to “address the equal-protection claim and the immateriality of the 
Hofeller files . . . so that the lawfulness of the Secretary’s decision can be 
fully and finally resolved.”161 To be clear: the Trump Administration asked 
the Supreme Court to decide an issue which was not before it, on which it 
had received no briefing, and which was not the subject of oral argument at 
the Court. The Court did not comply. 
Almost a year after the Supreme Court’s Department of Commerce 
decision, the trial court entered sanctions against DOJ for significant failures 
in producing the citizenship question administrative record and other 
 
157. See supra Part II.B. 
158. See Mem. in Supp. of Pls’ Rule 60(b)(2) Mot. for Relief from Final Judgment, 
Kravitz v. Dep’t of Commerce, No. 18-cv-01041, Dkt. No. 162-1 (D. Md. June 3, 
2019). 
159. See Mem. Op., Kravitz v. Dep’t of Commerce, No. 18-cv-01041, Dkt. No. 175, at 
13 (D. Md. June 24, 2019) (“The question of whether the Secretary’s true 
reasoning was driven by discriminatory animus is . . . weighty. But . . . it is 
becoming difficult to avoid seeing that which is increasingly clear. As more 
puzzle pieces are placed on the mat, a disturbing picture of the 
decisionmakers’ motives takes shape.”). 
160. Unión del Pueblo Entero v. Ross, No. 19-1382, Dkt. No. 45 (4th Cir. June 25, 
2019). 
161. Letter of Noel J. Francisco, Solicitor Gen., re: Department of Commerce, et al. 
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discovery materials.162 The district court’s ruling cited the July 2019 
unearthing of the Hofeller materials as well as other post-trial 
developments that caused the “plot to thicken[] twice”163: in November 
2019, the House Oversight Reform Committee released stunning documents 
and communications—some, mentioned in Section II.B—in connection with 
its investigation into “the Trump Administration’s false rationale for adding 
a citizenship question to the 2020 census.”164 Defendants should have, but 
failed to, release these documents during discovery or as part of the 
administrative record. Later that month, Defendants began producing 
documents they claimed “were inadvertently not produced in 
discovery,”165—documents that addressed directly the sham VRA 
enforcement rationale the Trump Administration put forth for the 
citizenship question. Ultimately, the court concluded that DOJ “failed to 
produce at least 900 documents . . . totaling 3,700 pages” or “ten percent of 
the documents [it] was required to produce as part of th[e] litigation.”166 “To 
be sure,” the court remarked, “this was not DOJ’s finest hour.”167 
This case makes clear that litigators may have a special role to play 
where elected officials try to shut marginalized communities from the 
political process. And it has shown that civil rights litigators must be dogged 
in discovery, particularly when suspicious that government officials are 
acting in bad faith. The continued assault on democracy unfortunately 
demands nothing less. 
B. Where activists and policymakers go from here 
Even though a citizenship question will not be on the 2020 census, two 
imminent threats remain. First, the threat of a citizenship question—and 
the misinformation, distrust, fear, and chaos it caused—may still deter 
 
162 Opinion and Order, New York v. Dep’t of Commerce, No. 18-cv-02921, ECF No. 
694, at 21-22 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2020).  
163 Id. at 6. 
164. Memorandum to Members of the Committee on Oversight and Reform from 
Acting Chairwoman Carolyn B. Maloney, at 1 (Nov. 12, 2019), 
https://oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/201
9-11-12.Memo%20to%20COR%20Members%20re.%20Census.pdf. 
165. Letter of James J. Gilligan, Special Litigation Counsel, to Matthew Colangelo, 
State of New York v. Dep’t of Commerce, No. 18-cv-02921, Dkt. No. 669-1, at 1 
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 2019). 
166 Opinion and Order, New York v. Dep’t of Commerce, No. 18-cv-02921, ECF No. 
694, at 22-23 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2020). 
167 Id. at 22.   
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individuals in noncitizen households and communities from responding to 
the census. Speaking before the House Oversight and Reform Committee in 
January 2020, Arturo Vargas, the CEO of the nonprofit National Association 
of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials, testified: 
 
There has been damage done by the citizenship question debacle . . . . 
The citizenship question debacle has created and continues to foster 
fear and doubt. Many Latinos are resistant to participate in the census 
because they believe there will be a citizenship question on the form, 
despite its absence, and many fear how the data would be used. This is 
exacerbated by a hostile environment toward immigrants propagated 
by this Administration.”168 
 
Further, House Oversight Chair Carolyn Maloney stated that she was 
“gravely concerned” that the 2020 census was “underfunded,”169 while 
groups in New York filed suit in late 2019 demanding “immediate relief” for 
what it alleges as impermissibly low spending on the census.170 
Grassroots organizations—including the immigrants’ rights groups the 
authors and other advocates had the privilege of representing in the 
citizenship question cases—are working tirelessly to ensure that 
communities of color are counted in 2020. At a rally held on the Supreme 
Court steps after the Department of Commerce argument, an undocumented 
woman told the assembled crowd that she risked deportation that day to be 
inside the courtroom. And she warned about the dangers of letting the 
census be perversely coopted to distort democracy and harm communities 
of color. Supporting the 2020 census Counts coalition and other groups 
doing the vital grassroots work to turn people out for the census honors her 
 
168. Reaching Hard-to-Count Communities in the 2020 Census Before the H. 
Comm. on Oversight & Reform, 116th Cong. ____ (2019) (Statement of Arturo 
Vargas, CEO, Nat’l Ass’n of Latino Elected & Appointed Officials), 
https://www.c-span.org/video/?467977-1/house-oversight-reform-
hearing-2020-census&start=1947 at 33:26-34:05. 
169. Reaching Hard-to-Count Communities in the 2020 Census Before the H. 
Comm. on Oversight & Reform, 116th Cong. ____ (2019) (Statement of Rep. 
Maloney, Chairwoman, H. Comm. on Oversight & Reform), https://www.c-
span.org/video/?467977-1/house-oversight-reform-hearing-2020-
census&start=1947 at 2:25-38. 
170. Jonathan Stempel, U.S. Starves 2020 Census of Funding, Threatens Undercount: 
NY Lawsuit, REUTERS (Nov. 26, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
usa-census-lawsuit/u-s-starves-2020-census-of-funding-threatens-
undercount-ny-lawsuit-idUSKBN1Y01RJ. 
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remarkable courage and the courage of countless other noncitizens 
advocating for their communities.171 
Second, there is the aforementioned threat that states—using data 
shared with them by the Trump Administration—will try to redistrict based 
on CVAP data rather than total population. Efforts have been made at the 
state and federal level to prohibit the use of CVAP data for apportionment 
issues—for example, through introduced federal legislation that would bar 
the Census Bureau from including citizenship information in the 
“redistricting file” that it shares with states.172 And many states have laws 
or constitutional provisions requiring that the state use actual census 
results for determining the population for redistricting purposes—a way to 
ensure that states use full count data rather than CVAP data.173 Lawmakers 
should continue to pursue similar efforts in other states, and activists can 
and should demand legislation to ensure that states are not using CVAP data 
for districting in the next round starting in 2021. 
 Most broadly, activists, policymakers, lawyers, and the broader 
American public ought to stay alert—particularly on “procedural” and even 
clerical-sounding changes to law or policy. Turning away from the complex 
and often dry busywork of democratic oversight would prove disastrous. 
Complacency could lead to communities and their residents losing schools, 
health care, and representation. As they were to Hofeller, the stakes are 
clear to many who would change the rules at the expense of communities of 
color. They must be equally clear to anyone who would have America’s 
democracy reflect its diversity and changing demography. 
*** 
The citizenship question case was a technically and procedurally 
complex litigation. At bottom, however, the dispute centered on a very 
simple question that the Trump Administration refused to answer: why does 
the census need a citizenship question? Even in March 2018, before any 
litigation discovery had been taken, the notion that the Administration 
added the question to help enforce the VRA made no sense. Nor did 
Secretary Ross’s decisional memo, which outlined the VRA rationale. Given 
that “all of the relevant evidence before Secretary Ross—all of it—
demonstrated that” a citizenship question would produce worse data than 
 
171. Census Counts, About Us (2020), https://censuscounts.org/about. 
172. Sen. Cory Booker, Sen. Booker Introduces Bill to Prohibit Use of Citizenship Data 
for Redistricting (July 10, 2019), 
https://www.scribd.com/document/416314267/Sen-Booker-Introduces-
Bill-to-Prohibit-Use-of-Citizenship-Data-for-Redistricting. 
173. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. VI, §§ 1-3; MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 2. 
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the federal government currently can access,174 the decisional 
memorandum gave no believable reason for the decision to add the question 
to the 2020 census. As a result, most of the litigation that culminated in the 
Supreme Court’s Department of Commerce decision revolved around forcing 
the Administration to answer that simple question. It never did. 
Despite the Trump Administration’s best efforts to stonewall, we know 
the real answer. The citizenship question was a two-pronged attack on the 
political power of communities of color and, by extension, our democracy. 
Litigation frustrated a first, more straightforward approach—to 
dramatically reduce response rates to the census in immigrant communities 
of color by weaponizing those individuals’ fears of the federal government 
and the Trump Administration in particular. But a second approach—the 
lesser-understood plan to use a citizenship question to get granular-enough 
data to allow states to apportion based on citizen voting-age population, 
rather than total population—lives on. And the Administration’s recent 
brute force attempt to manipulate House apportionment by excluding 
undocumented immigrants from the apportionment count is, beyond any 
doubt, likewise part and parcel of this attack.175  
The endgame here is the same that drives voter suppression efforts 
across the country: a furious attempt to prevent the political consequences 
of the country’s changing demographics by rigging the rules against 
communities of color. This undemocratic endeavor will only fail if 
advocates, activists, and organizers zealously defend the rights of 
marginalized communities and hold public officials accountable. Challenges 
to the citizenship question were part of that effort. They succeeded, but the 
fight goes on. 
 
174. New York, 351 F. Supp. 3d at 650. 
175 See White House, Statement from the President Regarding Apportionment (July 
21, 2020), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-
president-regarding-apportionment/ (“Last summer in the Rose Garden, I told the 
American people that I would not back down in my effort to determine the 
citizenship status of the United States population.”). 
